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S.: Liability Insurance--Breach of Co-Operation Clause--Failure of In
CASE COMMENTS
person or property of another creates a liability in tort." Morgan,
DeclarationsAgainst Interest, 5 VAND.L. REV. 451, 475 (1952). The
South Carolina court made no mention of this possibility in the
principal case.

The

MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE rule 509 (1942), and the UNIRU=E OF EVIDENCE 68(10), have taken still another approach
and urge that declarations against any of the four interests, pecuniary, proprietary, penal, and social, should be tested by the trial
court using a reasonable man test, i.e., would a reasonable man in
the declarant's position have made such a statement if he did not
believe it to be true?
FORM

It is submitted that the courts in following precedent have
overlooked the very purpose for which this exception was brought
into existence-to admit into evidence declarations made under circumstances inducive of trustworthiness. If the courts will admit a
statement by a declarant that he owes a $25.00 debt on the basis
that he would not have made such a statement unless it were true
would it not be more reasonable to assume that a man would not
confess to the crime of murder, of much more concern and involving
more serious consequences, unless it were also not true?
The judicial decisions in this area are so firmly established
that most states will require legislative help to expand the rule to
its proper bounds.
G. D. G.

LiABmrry INSURANcE-BREACH OF CO-OPERATION CLAUsE-FAILTo TEsTxn.-Plaintiff brought suit to recover for

URE OF INSURED

injuries sustained while riding as a passenger in Brown's automobile.
Brown was insured against personal liability by the defendant, the
policy providing that Brown should co-operate with the defendant
in securing and giving evidence. Brown gave the defendant a
written statement of the details of the accident. Before the trial
Brown informed the defendant insurer that he could no longer recall the circumstances of the accident due to traumatic amnesia, and
that the written statement he had prepared earlier was based on
information given him by other persons involved in the accident.
Held, Brown had not violated the co-operation provision of the
policy so as to relieve the defendant from liability. Brown v. State
Farm Mutual life Ins. Co., 104 S.E.2d 673 (S.C. 1958).
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The co-operation clause with which the court was here concerned, is a general provision in most automobile liability insurance
policies. The particular one in controversy was stated thus: "The
insured shall co-operate with company and upon its request attend
hearings, and trials, assist in effecting settlement, securing and giving evidence .... " (Emphasis added.) The insurance policy also
included the standard provision that "no action shall lie against the
company ...unless as a condition precedent thereto there shall have

been full compliance with all the terms of the policy."
The first consideration of the effect of the insured's failure to
testify should be the general nature of the co-operation clause. Cooperation clauses are universally held to be valid. Schoenfield v.
New Jersey Fidelity Plate Glass Ins. Co., 197 N.Y. Supp. 606 (1922).
They are also held to be material conditions of insurance policies.
Cameron v. Berger, 386 Pa. 229, 7 A.2d 293 (1938). A few courts
have held such clauses to be conditions subsequent to liability of the
insurer, Houran v. PreferredAccident Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 258, 195 At.
253 (1937); however, the general rule is that they are conditions
precedent to liability on the part of the insurer. Roberts v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 252, 171 S.E. 533 (1933). General Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Kierstad, 67 F.2d (8th Cir. 1983).
To be considered such a breach of the policy as to relieve liability of the insurer, the rule is stated by some courts that the insurer
must show that it was substantially prejudiced by such breach.
Hynding v. Home Accident Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743,7 P.2d 999 (1932).
A few courts have held that the requirement that the insured cooperate is a "contract right" and in determining whether the condition has been breached, prejudice need not appear. Curranv. Commercial Indemnity Co., 127 Conn. 692, 20 A.2d 87 (1941). The
general rule, however, appears to be that to relieve liability of the
insurer, the insured's lack of co-operation must be material. Conroy
v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 292 Pa. 219, 140 AUt. 905 (1928).
The general rule as to the duty of the insured herein, is that he
must comply in a reasonable and substantial manner. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Rexroad, 197 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1952). Thus, the insured
may not intentionally and falsely claim that he cannot remember the
facts concerning the accident. Searls v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.,
316 Mass. 606, 56 N.E.2d 127 (1944). He is not required of course,
to help the insurer present a sham defense. Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 213 N.Y. Supp. 522 (1926). He is expected only
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to act honestly and in good faith, in rendering assistance to the company. American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Mack, 84 F. Supp. 224 (E.D.
Ky. 1940).
When the insured intentionally makes false statements, materially misleading the insurer, the policy is considered avoided. U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wyer, 60 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1932). A
breach may include not only such fraud or collusion, but may also
include the mere refusal of the insured to do a positive act, i.e.,
failure to testify. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wyer, supra. In
any instance, whether the insured has failed to co-operate with the
terms of the policy so as to relieve liability on the part of the insurer,
is a question for the jury. Seltzer v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 252 N.Y.
330, 169 N.E. 403 (1929).
The courts have recognized the dangers inherent in cases where
the insured is involved in a suit wherein the plaintiff is a member
of his own family or is a close friend. Storer v. Ocean Accident &
GuaranteeCorp., 80 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1935). But even in considering suits between strangers, the courts have often pointed to the
prejudicial effect to the insurer when the insured does not comply
with the co-operation clause. In Watkins v. Watkins, 210 Wis. 606,
245 N.W. 695 (1932), the court said that if insurers may not contract
for, and receive helpful co-operation in automobile accident cases,
they are practically at the mercy of the participants in such suits.
Waiver or estoppel on the part of the insurer or a bona fide excuse on the part of the insured, will relieve the necessity of the defendant testifying or co-operating in accordance with the provision of
the policy. Curran v. Commercial Indemnity Co., 127 Conn. 692,
20 A.2d 87 (1941). While a valid excuse would then relieve defendants from testifying, in cases such as this where the insured pleads
traumatic amnesia or some variant psychosis thereof, it is believed
that the courts should attend such pleas with the most stringent and
demanding grounds of proof. Of all the reasons for not assisting the
insurer in disposing of claims, amnesia, or any type of psychosis, is
perhaps the most illusive, and hardest to accurately establish. Henry
A. Davidson, M.D., discussing amnesia, has laid down the following
as tests necessary in criminal actions to fully establish the existence
of a true state of amnesia: ".... the doctor should have reports showing a negative skull X-ray, an electro-encephalogram which does not
reflect either an epileptic nor a traumatic pattern, a negative
neurologic examination, a life history which does not suggest
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hysteria, a picture inconsistent with alcoholic amnesia, and a clinical
examination negative for psychosis." DAVmSON, FoRENsic PsYCHIATEY

161 (1952).
In view of the thoroughness and stringency of these requirements, it is felt that in dealing with this phantasm, no marked differences should apply in establishing the validity of a plea of amnesia in civil cases. This would seem particularly necessary considering the frequent incidence of an attitude of an "open season" against
insurance companies, even on the part of the insured against his own
insurer. ]t is quite generally acknowledged that herein, many people believe that any means are justified in effecting recoveries from
insurance companies. Many persons do not realize that insurance
policies axe contracts defining not only the rights of both parties,
but also demanding certain duties from both.
In this case as reported, there was no indication that such testing
methods, or any part thereof, were applied to the defendant's plea
of amnesia. While the decision on the facts in this case may still
have been rendered in all due justice, it is submitted that in view of
the considerations presented herein, the courts should approach with
the greatest of caution those cases where a defendant claims so
spurious a reason as amnesia as the basis for his refusal to testify.
It not only appears to be perhaps the most difficult ground to prove,
but the possibilities of its abuse, are, for this very reason, the more
unpropitious to the insurer.
L. B. S.
TAXATION-EXCHANGE OF PRINCIPAL REsIDENCE; EXCHANGE OF
PRoPERiTY HELD FoR PRoDucrVE UsE.-Taxpayer's principal place of

residence, with a market value of $9,000, was located on his farm
which he held for productive use, their combined market value
being $90,200, and having a taxable basis of $45,000. He exchanged
both for another farm having a market value of $75,000, and received $15,200 as "boot" from the exchange. Within twelve months,
taxpayer invested in excess of the market value of his old residence
in a new principal residence, and allocated $9,000 of the "boot"
received on the exchange of productive property to the exchange
of residences. As a result of this allocation, taxpayer contended that
his taxable gain on the entire transaction was $6,200. Held, in an
action to recover taxes paid, that since the government had provided
no regulation applicable to this type of exchange, it could not com-
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